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THE U.S. LIFE INSURANCE 
INDUSTRY- 
THE NEXT FIVE YEARS 
Executive Vice President and General Counsel, 
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States 
N e w  York, N e w  York 
[Former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission] 
I thought I would talk about the challenges for the life insurance 
industry over the next few years. I make what is probably a fair 
assumption: most of you know more about banking and securities than 
you know about life insurance, so I will spend a little time talking about 
the way a life insurance company looks to people with a background in 
banking and securities. 
I spent a week in Japan last month talking to executives at Japanese 
life insurance companies. That was an astonishing experience, not only 
because of the size and strength of their life insurance industry, but also 
because the principal subjects of debate in the Japanese life insurance 
industry are exactly the subjects of debate that have occupied the Morin 
Center for the past few years. These include the Glass-Steagall Act,' 
deregulation of banking,2 and the demutualization of life insurance 
companies .3 
During the occupation of Japan by the United States, General 
McCarthur imposed the Glass-Steagall Act4 on the Japanese financial 
- 
'See Glass-Steagall: Does It Have a Future in Banking?, 2 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 
51 (1983). 
*See St Germain, The Effects of Deregulation on the Structure o f  Banking, 1 ANN. 
REV. BANKING L. 77 (1982); Cimeno, Jr., The Challenges ofzncreased Regulatory 
Supervision: Introduction, 6 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 223 (1987) (conference 
proceedings). 
3See Fenske, Going Public: The  Critical Choice, in BEST'S REVIEW: LIFE/ 
HEALTH INSURANCE DITION, Jan. 1985, at 28. 
4Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) 
Heinonline - -  9 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 419 1990 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW / 1990 
system.5 Someone apparently told him that mutual life insurance 
companies were more democratic than stock companies, so he mutualized 
them by fiat in Japan.6 They are now wrestling with exactly the same 
issue with which we are wrestling-from, of course, a peculiarly Japanese 
angle. For example, in the demutualization debate, the proposal for 
demutualization comes not from the life insurance companies, which are 
very happy being mutual companies, but from the banks, because the 
banks want to demutualize the life insurance companies and then buy 
them.' That is more than a sidelight on this discussion, I think, because it 
reflects a worldwide trend. If I can coin a double cliche, I would call that 
trend the "globalization of the homogenization of financial institutions"; 
what we are going through is exactly what is going on  all over the world. 
What is a life insurance company going to face over the next five 
years? In a sense, the life insurance industry is facing the same types of 
issues that face other financial institutions. There are three broad 
categories: the first set of challenges has to do with marketing and product 
differentiation, the second with deregulation and tax policy, and the third 
with internationalization. Depending upon one's views of interest rates, I 
suppose there could be a fourth, contingent set of challenges that would be 
grouped under the rubric of inflation. 
Let me begin with marketing and product differentiation. To really 
understand these challenges one has to understand what has happened to 
the life insurance business. Life insurance companies, as well as life 
insurance products, have developed in a way that parallels developments 
in the banking and securities industries. 
Look a t  the insurance distribution system, particularly the career 
agency system, which is similar to the distribution system in a retail 
securities firm. I spent two years at E. F. Hutton before coming to the 
Equitable, and the similarities between them are both extraordinary and 
striking. Much of the strength of life insurance companies, particularly 
the large mutual life insurance companies, comes from the career agency 
system. These companies have an impressive ability to deliver very 
sophisticated advice about complex financial products to retail 
5See Semkow, Japanese Banking Law: Current Deregulation and Liberalization o f  
Domestic and External Financial Transactions, in 17 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 81, 
119 (1985). 
6See Murphy, Japan: Land o f  Rising Opportunity, in BEST'S REVIEW: LIFE/ 
HEALTH INSURANCE DITION, June 1987, at 48. 
'See Fenske, supra note 3. 
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consumers. Insurance products are not stocks and bonds. Although many 
are really not very different from mutual funds, there are major 
differences at the point of sale. What the life insurance salesman talks 
about with a customer is quite different from what the security salesman 
discusses. From the perspective of the management of the life insurance 
company, however, the two distribution systems look very much alike. 
They are both based on full-time career salesmen; both sales forces are 
geographically decentralized and highly independent; they both sell 
complex financial products; both salesman are compensated on a 
commission basis, which means that they have their eye firmly fixed on 
the top line and not the bottom line; and they both present very similar 
kinds of challenges to management. 
There are also many similarities between life insurance and banking. 
The traditional life insurance company is, fundamentally, a financial 
intermediary. From this perspective, insurance policies are simply the 
liability side of the balance sheet. These liabilities are longer and much 
more complex than a bank's deposits, but from the point of view of asset 
and liability management, they function in exactly the same way. In that 
sense, the life insurance company is no more in the life insurance business 
than a bank is in the checking account and C D  business. The insurance 
sales force gathers assets; that is its fundamental purpose. The company 
seeks to profit from the spread between the residue from assets and the 
expense of gathering and repaying liabilities. The challenge for a life 
insurance company is to match properly those assets and liabilities and 
invest them so that the company can satisfy its liabilities and make some 
money in the process. 
There are, of course, differences between banks and life insurance 
companies. Because the liabilities are much longer and much more 
complex, the challenge of asset and liability management is more 
daunting for a life insurance company. If you make a mistake, it stays with 
you for a very long time. Another interesting difference is that a life 
insurance company sells liabilities-that is, insurance policies-rather 
than assets. Liability products are responsive to customer demand, and 
the distribution system is customer driven. Compare that to a bank, 
which I would generally regard as asset driven. Banks tend to forecast 
loan demand and then decide the best way to fund those loans, since there 
are a variety of liabilities available for that purpose. An insurance 
company tends to focus on selling its liabilities and then figures out how to 
make money on the assets that are gathered. 
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Finally, life insurance companies have become very significant 
investment managers. There are really two aspects to this business. First, 
many large life insurance companies have bought large investment 
management firms. Alliance Capital, for example, with more than $40 
billion under management, is a subsidiary of the Equitable. More 
significantly, the life insurance business itself has become an investment 
management business. Inflation caused the development of a series of 
investment products lodged within life insurance companies' variable life 
and annuity products. These products pass on to the customer the risks 
and the benefits of the investment management process. Although the life 
insurance company is still an intermediary, it is really compensated on a 
fee basis. 
What does all of this have to do with marketing and product 
differentiation? Simply this: As the products offered by all types of 
financial institutions start to fill similar needs, and as each type of 
financial institution gains increasing power to offer the products of the 
other, financial products start to look like commodities to the customer. 
Life insurance companies have traditionally had a high-cost distribution 
structure. There is nothing worse than being the high-cost producer in a 
commodity business. 
There are only two ways to deal with this business crunch, and the life 
insurance industry is working on both of them. The first includes 
reducing costs. It is extremely difficult, however, to decrease significantly 
the cost of a career sales force because the strength of that sales force is its 
ability to deliver very sophisticated advice about the complex products 
which life insurance companies sell. This strength rests on a substantial 
investment in recruiting and training, as well as compensation. If that 
investment is drastically cut, there is a risk of eroding service quality. The 
second way to address this business crunch is to focus on marketing so that 
those high quality services are delivered to people who want them and are 
willing to pay a premium for them. I think this is an area in which the life 
insurance industry in general has been very weak. Its concepts of market 
segmentation are rudimentary and in many cases do not exist at all. As an 
industry, its conception of its customer base is quite abstract. 
One of the reasons that the life insurance industry has lagged behind 
other financial institutions in marketing is that, more than in any other 
industry, life insurance companies have tended to identify themselves with 
their own products. Instead of thinking in terms of offering products 
which meet their customers' long-term financial needs, they tend to think 
of themselves as being in the business of meeting their customers' needs 
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for life insurance or annuities. It is only a half step, really, from thinking 
of yourself as being in the business of filling your customers' needs for life 
insurance to thinking of yourself as being in the business of filling your 
customers' need for your kind of life insurance. When you do that you 
have lost the competitive race. In contrast, if you think in terms of 
meeting your customers' needs for financial security, you end up with a 
very different set of products, a different marketing strategy, and a 
different focus. 
Let me turn for a few minutes to the challenges posed by regulation 
and tax policy. A principal challenge for life insurance companies is going 
to come from further deregulation in banking. The life insurance industry 
has adopted the views of other industries in this position: a disbelief that 
new entrants into the industry can compete effectively and gain 
substantial market share because "they really cannot do it our way." That 
was certainly the attitude for many years taken by those in the securities 
industry. Although banks have hardly taken over the securities business, I 
think there has been a clear demonstration of their ability to gain market 
share. Since the market crash of 1987, the inclination of the larger banks 
to engage in the securities business has lessened along with the declining 
profitability of a securities business.% Accordingly, many of the larger 
banks have turned with renewed interest to insurance and, particularly, to 
selling i n ~ u r a n c e . ~  This renewed interest poses two major questions: are 
the banks going to be successful, on the regulatory side, in gaining that 
power and, if they are, are they going to be successful in the marketplace? 
With respect to the first question, one need only analyze what has 
already happened in the last ten years in banking and securities to see that 
there is very little reason to expect the movement of banks into the sale of 
life insurance to be blocked. There are two events which one might have 
looked to as creating a trend toward reregulation: the market crash in 
1987 and the current state of the S&L industry. Looking at the market 
crash, it is remarkable that it had almost no impact on the Glass- 
Steagalll0 debate or on the pace of deregulation. Its sole impact seems to 
'[BAA Says Obtaining New Products and Services First Priority in 1988, 50 Banking 
Rep. (BNA) 163 (Feb. 1, 1988). 
9 ~ d .  
l0Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
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have been to get Congress to consider seriously Senator Proxmire's billll 
to abolish the Glass-Steagall Act entirely. I would be very surprised if the 
market crash had any impact at all on the debate about insurance powers 
for banks. 
There are many people who believe that the state of the S&L industry 
is largely due to the pace at which S&Ls were given new asset powers1* in 
order to cope with the disintermediation that arose in the '70s and early 
'80s.13 Again, I would be very surprised if that had any impact at all on 
the ability of banks to sell life insurance. I do not think that the sale of life 
insurance poses any safety and soundness problems. What we are left with 
is a simple political fight, largely between the insurance agents and the 
banks.14 Generally, my experience with such raw political fights is that 
they hold back the tide for a surprisingly long time, but, in the long run, 
they cannot stem the pace of change if it makes economic sense. 
Although life insurance companies have to prepare for significant 
bank entry into their business, there is still the issue of whether banks will 
be successful. I think the answer depends on how the issue is framed. At 
least in the short run, banks are not going to be successful in developing 
the ability to deliver highly individualized, sophisticated advice on 
insurance products. Similarly, banks have not been a significant 
competitive threat to that sector of the market in the securities business. 
O n  the other hand, banks will find ways to build on their own competitive 
advantages and satisfy a substantial part of their customers7 needs for life 
insurance; just as the securities industry was able to find insurance 
products that fit its competitive advantage neatly.15 
The second major regulatory challenge goes to the heart of the way 
that life insurance is regulated in America. It concerns the quality of state 
regulation. The quality of regulation in many states leaves a great deal to 
be desired. The resources devoted to regulating life insurance companies 
in virtually every state-even New York, which, I think, is among the 
best-are inadequate. The "state guarantee funds," which are analogous 
llS. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. S3520 (daily ed. Mar. 
31, 1988). 
12See N. EICHLER, THE THRIFT DEBACLE 64-65 (1989). 
131d. at 43. 
14See, e.g.,  OCC Urged Not to Approve Citibank's Application to Underwrite Title 
Insurance, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 324 (Feb. 6, 1989). 
15See Douglas Bremen & Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Nov. 3, 1988). 
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to the FDIC and the FSLIC, are not funds at a11.16 They are a "post 
assessment scheme" to cover the cost of insolvency. A life insurance 
company that wants to do business in a state must agree to an annual 
assessment to cover the cost of insolvency. The charge is based on the 
amount of business that the life insurance company conducts in the 
state.l7 There is an annual limit on the amount that any individual life 
insurance company can be assessed in a state in any given year.18 Those 
limits, which are necessary to participation, also render the insurance 
funds inadequate. 
Some years ago, when I was still in private practice, my firm was 
retained by the board of Baldwin-United as it began to collapse.1g The 
state guarantee fund for Baldwin-United was in the state of Indiana.20 
Baldwin-United had about $9 billion in annuity liabilities and it did not 
have enough liquid assets.21 We calculated that it would have taken almost 
twenty years for the Indiana State Guarantee Fund to pay fully all of the 
Baldwin-United policyholders because of the ceilings on the annual 
 assessment^.^^ Moreover, the other state that was involved was Arkansas, 
and it did not have any guarantee fund at all.*3 It does not take much to 
strain this system. 
There are consultants-"futurologists"-who believe that they can 
predict future events by counting the lines of newspaper copy devoted to a 
given subject; it is a kind of free market approach to predicting the future. 
To a casual reader, anyway, there has been a marked increase in the 
number of newspaper lines devoted to insurance insolvencies in the last 
few years. I do not know what is going to happen, but it would not be 
surprising if there were a couple of smaller, but substantial, life insurance 
16See Baldwin Case Indicated Flaws in States' Ways o f  Regulating Insurers, Wall St. 
J. ,  Feb. 14, 1984, at 1, col. 6. 
''See, e . g . ,  PRACTISING LAW INST., INSOLVENCY AND SOLIDITY OF 
INSURANCE COMPANIES 122-23 (Commercial Law and Practice, Concise 
Handbook Series No. 416 (1987)). 
181d. at 123. 
19See Baldwin Case Indicated Flaws in States' Ways o f  Regulating Insurers, supra 
note 16. 
201d. 
21Davline & Solomon, Baldwin-United Is Forced to File for Chapter 11, Wall St. 
J . ,  Sept. 27, 1983, at 3, col. 1. 
22See Baldwin Case Indicated Flaws in States' Ways of Regulating Insurers, supra 
note 16. 
231d. 
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companies that fail, particularly if inflation rears its ugly head again. If a 
few life insurance companies valued at $5 to $10 billion fail, that would 
really strain the system. Moreover, this is not the best time, as you can 
imagine, to go back to Congress and ask for a new insurance fund for life 
insurance policyholders. History teaches us that if that were to happen, 
there would be very repressive and rigid legislation. The life insurance 
industry, which is now only throwing off the shackles of an incredibly rigid 
system that grew out of some regulatory problems at the end of the 19th 
century,24 would have problems in developing a modern financial 
institution. I think a very important challenge for this industry is 
managing that difficult process. 
Just a word on tax policy. "Tax policy" in the United States has come 
to mean "revenue raising policy," and one of the sources of revenue these 
days is the life insurance industry. A particularly attractive revenue source 
which is not currently taxed to the policyholder is the "inside buildup," 
which is the increase in value in a life insurance policy as premiums are 
paid and the money is invested. The comparable increase in value, for 
example, is taxed to a mutual fund invest0r.2~ There are  proposal^,^^ and 
there will be proposals again this year, to tax the inside buildup. In my 
opinion, this would be very unfortunate, because one of our major 
problems in this country is the low level of long-term individual savings. 
Virtually the only major sources of long-term individual savings are life 
insurance and pension fund savings;27 the life insurance industry plays a 
key role in providing long-term capital for pension funds.28 I think a tax 
system that discourages long-term savings would be a terrible mistake. It 
would be counterproductive because it would sacrifice the long-term 
interest of Americans for short-term political gain. 
To end, let me say just a word about internationalization. The major 
forces that have shaped the financial markets in this country have been the 
24See McDowell, Competition as a Regulatory Mechanism in Insurance, 19 CONN. 
L. REV 287 (1987). 
2 5 S ~ ~ ~ ~  OF JOINT COMM. O N  TAXATION, lOOTH CONG., 2D SESS., 
REPORT O N  BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATING TO THE TAX TREATMENT 
OF SINGLE PREMIUM AND OTHER INVESTMENT-ORIENTED LIFE INSURANCE 
25 (Comm. Print 1988). 
261d. at 31 -40. 
271d. at 25. 
28Arnt, Gradison: No New Insurer Taxes in NATIONAL UNDERWRITER CO.: 
LIFE & HEALTH/FINANCIAL SERVICES EDITION, Feb. 27, 1989, at 3.  
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following: First, the institutionalization of savings, which was basically a 
post-World War I1 phenomenon; second, the growth of information 
technology; third, rampant inflation in the 1970s and the early 1980s; 
fourth, the significantly increased sophistication of individual consumers 
of f inanc ia l  services;  a n d  finally, i n t e rna t i ona l i za t i on .  
Internationalization is the most recent trend and, therefore, the least 
understood. I have no doubt' that it is going to change profoundly the 
nature of American financial institutions. 
For regulatory reasons, American life insurance companies have 
really lagged behind the rest of the financial services industry in this area. 
Today, a New York insurance company-and many of the largest 
companies are subject to New York law-can only invest ten percent of the 
insurer's admitted assets in Canada and one and one-half times the 
insurer's reserves outside of North America.Z9 Compare that to the 
lending activities of C i t i ~ o r p , ~ ~  or the fact that the similar limit on a 
Japanese life insurance company is thirty percent.31 This is a significant 
constraint on the industry that clearly is going to change. 
The life insurance industry has been very active about foreign 
investing. The Equitable, for example, manages over $2 billion for 
Japanese investors, largely in U.S. real estate and through LBO funds. 
Furthermore, internationalization is starting to change the liability side of 
the business as well. The coming of 1992 in Europe has caused all kinds of 
financial institutions, and certainly life insurance companies, to scramble 
to get inside the European Community before the grandfathering rights 
are set.32 There was a similar scramble to get into the United Kingdom 
before it's "Big Bang,,' and the high price many banks and securities 
f i rms  have paid  for  t ha t  process is well known.33 I th ink  
internationalization is probably the area of greatest challenge for the life 
insurance industry, which has really only put' its toe in the water. Life 
insurance is essentially, at least on the liability side, inherently local. 
29N.Y. INS. LAW 4 1405(7) (McKinney 1985). 
30See Draft Regulation Bans Loan Referral Fees, Reverses Earlier H U D  Position, 52 
Banking Rep. (BNA) 63 (Jan. 9, 1989). 
31See Japanese Insurers, BUS. INS., at 28, Jan. 4, 1988. 
32See EC 1992, Financial Institutions Policy Will Be Focus of Competitiveness 
Council, 52 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1389-90 (June 26, 1989). 
33See Japanese Securities Industry Opposes Efforts to Eliminate Barriers to Banking, 52 
Banking Rep. (BNA) 798 (Apr. 3,  1989). 
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There is a great deal of very important strategic thinking that has to be 
done to compete on this side of the business. 
Finally, I would like to close with a word about inflation. Inflation, as 
you know, transformed the financial markets in this country, and it 
certainly transformed the life insurance industry. Even the most 
traditional life insurance products today-for example, a whole-life 
policy-are now administered in a way that is almost entirely a result of 
volatile interest rates. Things have recently started to calm down. I have 
complete faith in the Federal Reserve's commitment to deal with the 
inflation problem; I have perhaps a little less faith in its complete ability to 
do so. It is very clear that if the Fed is not successful, then life insurance 
companies, as well as all other financial institutions, are going to spend 
much of the next five years dealing with the results of that problem. 
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